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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES:
Dyer v. Merry Shipping Co.
Charles Walter Dyer, a seaman on the tug "Royal Lady," drowned
when the vessel sank off the coast of South Carolina. His personal
representative brought suit against the shipowner, Merry Shipping,
Inc., in federal district court under both general maritime law and the
Jones Act.' Plaintiff included in her petition a claim for punitive damages,
alleging that Merry Shipping had failed to make proper stability tests
after substantially modifying the weight distribution of the vessel.2 The
district court upheld defendant's motion for dismissal of this claim, declar-
ing that, as a matter of law, punitive damages were not recoverable
under either the Jones Act or general maritime law. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded and held that
punitive damages may be recovered under general maritime law. The
court, however, expressly declined to decide whether such damages
were recoverable under the Jones Act. Dyer v. Merry Shipping, Inc.,
650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981).
Punitive damages, a controversial feature of American tort law,'
are the single exception to the general rule that civil damages are
designed primarily to compensate the injured party for actual losses.'
A punitive damage award results in a windfall because, theoretical-
ly, the plaintiff has been made whole by compensatory damages.
Courts, in making such awards, engage in "social engineering" because
they seek to punish and deter certain types of conduct. Critics main-
tain that neither policy justifies an award of punitive damages. Many
writers claim that punishment is not the proper function of civil courts
because these courts lack the safeguards inherent in criminal pro-
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1976).
2. The plaintiff alleged that insufficient onboard equipment and stability prob-
lems of which the defendant shipowner was aware warranted an award of punitive
damages. Specifically, the district court found that the 38,000 pound engine of the
Royal Lady had been replaced by one weighing only 15,000 pounds. Merry Shipping
was advised by a naval architect that stability would be marginal and that stability
tests should be performed. Despite that advice, only cursory tests were performed
and lengths of anchor chain were placed under the engine to provide ballast. These
tests and decisions were made by officers of the company who were unqualified in
naval architecture.
3. See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES SS 2.3 & 7.4 (1980) (a particularly
valuable work on all aspects of punitive damages); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 9 (4th
ed. 1971); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275 (1935).
4. K. REDDEN, supra note 3, S 2.1; W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 9.
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ceedings, which are designed to punish offenders.' Detractors also
question the deterrent effect of punitive damages, stressing that com-
pensatory damages alone are sufficient to achieve that result.'
The issue of punitive damages.has been litigated so seldomly in
federal admiralty courts that no definitive statement may be made
regarding the status of this remedy. The judicial pronouncements on
punitive damages must be gleaned from a few scattered cases, most
of which arose in the last decade. To the extent that any patterns
have emerged from the existing case law, it appears that the courts
have employed punitive damages as a means of enforcing certain stan-
dards of conduct in areas affected with a strong public policy. Prior
to Merry Shipping, all modern awards of such damages to seamen
had been levied only against defendants who intentionally interfered,
either directly or indirectly, with the free exercise of the legal rights
and remedies available to seamen.
The first modern award of punitive damages was in the 1973 case
of Robinson v. Pocahontas! In that case, a seaman who suffered back
injuries was refused maintenance and cure' and, in fact, was fired
for suspected malingering and venereal disease. Although the back
injuries became aggravated and the charges of malingering were never
proven, the company never fully honored its obligation. The First Cir-
cuit awarded punitive damages, relying on the dissenting opinion in
Vaughn v. Atkinson,' a 1962 case in which the Supreme Court had
awarded attorney fees for the "willful and persistent""0 refusal to pro-
vide maintenance and cure.
The public policy underlying the Robinson decision derives from
the virtually absolute nature of the seaman's right to maintenance
5. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 276; Note, Punitive Damages May be Awarded
in An Action Arising Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
1113 (1971); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive
Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158 (1966).
6. See Note, Punitive Damages May be Awarded in An Action Arising Under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1971).
7. 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973).
8. Although maintenance and cure is sometimes compared to workers' compen-
sation, the maritime remedy is more extensive and pervasive than its land-based counter-
part. The remedy extends to all injuries and illnesses encountered while in the "ser-
vice of the ship." The injury need not be suffered in the course of employment. The
action is defeated only by the seaman's own gross or willful misconduct. Furthermore,
while workers' compensation is awarded in lieu of negligence recovery, maintenance
and cure does not negate any other action of the seaman against his employer. See
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 281 (1975); A. SANN, S. BELLMAN, N.
GOLDEN & B. CHASE, 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY S 41-45 (1981).
9. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
10. Id. at 531.
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and cure, which is "imposed by the law itself as one annexed to
employment."1 Since the remedy provides for the immediate needs
of the seaman during his disability, delays in its administration tend
to frustrate its very aims. Therefore, imposition of punitive damages
for the blatant and intentional withholding of such payments is a
reasonable means of enforcing the seaman's rights.
Recently, in Pino v. Protection Maritime Insurance Co.,"2 a federal
district court assessed punitive damages against an insurance com-
pany which had been "blackballing" seamen who instituted claims
against their employers." The court referred to the Robinson and
Vaughan decisions as examples of wanton and intentional interferences
with the seaman's legal rights and ruled that punitive damages also
should be available "when other legal rights, such as the right to re-
tain employment, have been wilfully and tortiously interfered with."
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Ser-
vice, Inc.,"1 held that the retaliatory discharge of a seaman by his
employer did not warrant the imposition of punitive damages. The
Smith case, which rejected a claim of punitive damages for an inten-
tional tort, seemingly conflicts with the holding of Merry Shipping.
However, the cases are not inconsistent-they actually provide a
valuable illustration of the crucial balancing of the public policies which
underlie punitive damage awards. In Pino, punitive damages were held
to be appropriate in view of the quasi-public nature of the insurance
business. In Smith, the. Fifth Circuit recognized that retaliatory
discharge constituted an intentional tort, but held that punitive
damages were not appropriate in light of the countervailing public
policy of protecting the employer's traditional right to hire and fire
his employees at will. In this regard, the court said:
In striking the balance between the employer's right to have a
free hand in the running of his business and the seaman's interest
in the unencumbered exercise of his legal rights, we conclude that,
while the balance weighs in the seaman's favor on the question
of the recognition of the claim for retaliatory discharge, the scales
tilt against the imposition of punitive damages."
11. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932).
12. 490 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1980).
13. The insurance company charged higher premiums to employers who employed
certain seamen designated as "added premium" seamen. These seamen had previously
failed to settle insurance claims, retained legal counsel, and filed personal injury ac-
tions. Id. at 281.
14. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
15. 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Note, Retaliatory Discharge of Seamen:
Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 43 LA. L. REv. 221 (1982).16. 653 F.2d at 1064.
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While precedent exists for the award of punitive damages in a
maintenance and cure case, no federal court prior to Merry Shipping
had awarded punitive damages in an unseaworthiness or Jones Act
case. However, no court had denied them as a matter of law and only
a few opinions had accorded the issue any discussion at all.
In In re Marine Sulphur Queen," the shipowner had made substan-
tial structural modifications18 on a vessel which subsequently was lost
in a moderate storm. The Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs claim
for punitive damages, stating, "A condition precedent to awarding
them [punitive damages] is a showing by the plaintiff that the defen-
dant was guilty of gross negligence, or actual malice or criminal indif-
ference which is the equivalent of reckless and wanton misconduct."19
In United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman,0 the issue before the
Sixth Circuit was whether a corporate defendant should have been
liable for punitive damages in a suit against it based on its employee's
acts. In that case, a Great Lakes ore-carrying vessel was lost due
to the outrageous actions of the ship's master.y In a Jones Act suit
against the corporate owner of the vessel, the Sixth Circuit denied
punitive damages, holding that a corporation could not be held liable
for punitive damages for the actions of its employees unless it had
either authorized or ratified the conduct.22
In re Marine Sulphur Queen and United States Steel Corp. v.
Fuhrman, which indicate two possible requirements for an award of
punitive damages, are the only federal court decisions which provide
any guidance in the area of punitive damages in Jones Act or
unseaworthiness cases.' Since neither court actually awarded punitive
17. 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972).
18. The modifications included the removal of substantial portions of the keel and
centerline girder in order to accommodate large tanks for the carriage of molten sulphur.
Id. at 95.
19. Id. at 105. Although the modifications were innovative and were described
as "a calculated risk" by one expert, the designs were approved by the American
Bureau of Ships and the Coast Guard. Id. at 97-98.
20. 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
21. Id. at 1145. For a detailed and fascinating account of the events surrounding
the collision, see In re Den Norske Amerikalinge A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio
1967), rev'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
22. 407 F.2d at 1148. See text at notes 42-44, infra.
23. The following cases involved claims for punitive damages. However, the deci-
sions accorded the issue scant discussion and provide little or no guidance in this area.
Phillip v. United States Lines Co., 355 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1966); Kwak Hyung Rok v.
Continental Seafoods, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 894 (S.D. Ala. 1978), affd, 614 F.2d 292 (5th
Cir. 1980) (mem.); Renner v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 403 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1975),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1978); Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971) (mem.).
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damages, their statements are merely dicta.'
Although the holding in the instant case is unprecedented, the
Fifth Circuit found support for its decision in the history of awards
of punitive damages for certain maintainence and cure and intentional
tort claims. 5 The court articulated for the first time the public policy
which dictates an award of punitive damages in a general maritime
suit for unseaworthiness:
Punitive damages should be available when a shipowner has
willfully violated the duty to furnish and maintain a seaworthy
vessel. The shipowner's duty stems from the recognition of "the
hazards of marine service which unseaworthiness places on the
men who perform it . . .and their helplessness to ward off such
perils." Punitive damages would serve to deter and punish owners
whose reckless acts increase these hazards."
The decision in MeAry Shipping, which sanctions punitive damages
in unseaworthiness cases in the Fifth Circuit, can be judged best by
how well it serves its own stated aims. The safety of vessels tradi-
tionally has been a matter of paramount importance to the law of
admiralty. Therefore, it is important that a concept of punitive
damages evolves which effectively furthers this goal. However, the
parameters of such a concept should not place undue burdens on the
shipping industry. Unfortunately, the limited jurisprudence on the sub-
ject leaves several ambiguities and unanswered questions. First, the
standards of conduct by which such an award could be measured are
not clear. Second, no court has decided whether the shipowner should
be able to insure against the risk of punitive damages. Third, the ex-
tent of an employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages for the
acts of its employees is unclear. Finally, the question of availability
of punitive damages under the Jones Act is still open.
Clear standards by which to judge the conduct of the defendant
are central to a fair and effective doctrine of punitive damages. Un-
fortunately, no concrete guidelines exist in this area. This lack of stan-
dards is not peculiar to admiralty. It characterizes the entire field
of tort law. Despite the long history of the remedy and the complaints
of learned writers in the field,2 7 juries still receive punitive damages
24. The only award of punitive damages based on a Jones Act claim prior to the
Fifth Circuit's discussion in the instant case was granted by a California state court.
Baptiste v. Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 3d 87, 164
Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980).
25. 650 F.2d at 624-25.
26. 650 F.2d at 625-26.
27. In 1931, Professor Clarence Morris stated: "[Tihe punitive damage device as
now used provides for almost unlimited individualization of treatment of defendants.
... Such individualization is almost undirected; and is dependent on the hunches, in-
1983)
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cases with no instruction other than the standard admonition that the
defendant's conduct must be found to have been "willful, wanton, or
reckless.""8
Subjectivity may well be unavoidable or even desirable, since
punitive damage awards are based on the state of mind of the defen-
dant, the determination of which does not yield to precise rules.
However, the harsh and quasi criminal nature of the remedy suggests
that unbridled jury discretion is unacceptable. Without impinging on
the province of the jury to make findings of fact, several threshold
observations by the court could aid in the jury's deliberations. First,
care should be taken to identify the requisite mental element.
Although the terms willful, wanton, or reckless connote a positive men-
tal state, no actual intent need be found. This state of mind is better
described as a total disregard for the interests or safety of others -
an indifference under the circumstances that would be shocking to
the ordinary man.' But indifference should never be predicated on
the defendant's constructive knowlege. That is, there should be no
punitive damages awards when liability is vicarious unless the defen-
dant had actual knowlege of the harm-causing risks."0
Another reasonable threshold observation by the court would be
that the facts presented must negate any explanation of the defen-
dant's behavior other than recklessness or indifference. The defen-
dant's indifference should be total, and any positive finding of other
motivations or actions indicative of concern should preclude a punitive
damage award. The facts of Baptiste v. Superior Court of Los Angeles81
tuition, and 'common sense' of juries. There is no scheme of individualization, no system
for measuring punishment." C. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1171, 1189 (1931). Fifty years later, Professor Kenneth Redden wrote: "Perhaps the
strongest criticism of punitive damages is the total lack of clear guidelines to predict
the award. Predictability exists in the criminal law because both the unacceptable
conduct and the extent of punishment are defined by statute. Not so in a civil case."
REDDEN, supra note 3, at 726.
28. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 184-86.
29. This mental state is similar to that which is typically necessary for criminal
negligence. See LA. R.S. 14:12, comment (1950). The writer submits that reference to
criminal law is appropriate in the area of punitive damages because standards of con-
duct in criminal matters must be framed within the perimeters of constitutional
safeguards.
30. The Model Penal Code treatment of the terms negligently and recklessly is
instructive in this regard. In the Model Penal Code, a person is said to act recklessly
when he "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk." However, a per-
son acts negligently when he "should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk"
and his "failure to perceive it [the substantial and unjustifiable risk] involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the
actor's situation." MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.02 (1962).
31. 106 Cal. App, 3d 87, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980).
828 [Vol. 43
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illustrate this principle. In Baptiste, the defendant company was aware
of the possibility of hearing damage due to high engineroom noise
levels. However, because of the advanced age of the ships, the com-
pany decided that the repairs necessary to alleviate the problem were
economically unfeasible. As an alternative, the company undertook a
program to provide ear protection for engineroom workers and en-
forced this program's use.2 The California appellate court held that
this "calculated decision to practice economy" provided a valid cause
of action for punitive damages." The writer submits that the positive
evidence of an ear protection program should have precluded the jury
from even receiving the issue.
The jury also should receive instructions relative to any unique
features of the maritime environment which may bear on their deci-
sion. For instance, in Fuhrman, the corporate defendant had actual
knowledge of the seemingly reckless response of the ship's master to
an emergency situation.' The district court had assessed punitive
damages for corporate management's failure to countermand the
master's orders.' In reversing that award, the Sixth Circuit considered
the traditional necessity for absolute control by the master at sea.M
Another important question which the courts have not addressed
is whether the shipowner may insure against the risk of punitive
damages. The courts are split on this issue in nonadmiralty litigation.
However, in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty" the Fifth
Circuit rendered a landmark opinion which may indicate its position
in future admiralty litigation. The case arose out of a car accident
and was decided under the law of Florida,' which recognized punish-
ment and deterrence as the prime justifications for awarding punitive
damages. 9 The court held that if the actual wrongdoer was able to
shift the burden of punitive damages, both functions would be
frustrated." The Fifth Circuit also noted that the ultimate burden
would rest on all premium payers, through increased insurance rates."
The latter point seems particularly relevant to admiralty, where en-
32. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
33. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
34. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 958 (1970).
35. The fleet headquarters maintained radio contact with the stricken ship
thoughout the emergency. The managers of the fleet were fully apprised of the condi-
tions and the decisions of the master. 407 F.2d at 1144.
36. Id. at 1147.
37. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
38. Id. at 434-35.
39. Id. at 435.
40. Id. at 440.
41. Id. at 44041.
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couragement of shipping is an influential factor in policy making. If
insurance against liability for punitive damages was available, no wise
shipowner would proceed without the coverage and the resulting in-
crease in insurance rates would operate as advance punishment for
all shipowners. Thus, the shipping industry as a whole would bear
the losses occasioned by the reckless and willful tortfeasors, while
the actual tortfeasors would mitigate the losses occasioned by their
own conduct.
Another unresolved question concerns the related problems of
respondeat superior and corporate liability for the acts of employees.
Although the majority view in this country holds the employer
vicariously liable for punitive damages, a substantial minority requires
a finding that the conduct was actually authorized or ratified by cor-
porate management. 2 Fuhrman, the only federal admiralty case on
point, followed the minority view.'" Fuhrman was decided correctly
and should be followed by other federal courts sitting in admiralty.
While substantial justification exists for holding the employer liable
for actual damages, vicarious liability for punitive damages simply does
not serve any punitive or deterrent purposes. The majority view,
which is thought to encourage more selective hiring practices, ignores
the fact that violent or reckless behavior is impossible to predict with
any degree of certainty. Therefore, holding the employer liable in the
absence of his participation in or ratification of the conduct punishes
the wrong person." The Fuhrman holding provides a more precise
means of deterring and punishing conduct without placing undue
burdens on the shipping industry.
The fourth unresolved question is whether punitive damages are
available under the Jones Act. Although the Merry Shipping court
noted that uniformity of treatment in Jones Act and unseaworthiness
cases is not necessary,45 such uniformity certainly would be desirable,
42. K. REDDEN, supra note 3, SS 4.5 & 7.7.
43. See K. REDDEN, supra note 3, S 7.7.
44. See Note, supra note 6.
45. 650 F.2d at 626. The court dealt with the apparent inconsistency of allowing
punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases, in which liability is not predicated on fault,
by reasoning that the statutory constraints which may limit recovery under the Jones
Act do not apply to the common law unseaworthiness remedy. Furthermore, while
nonpecuniary losses may not be recovered under the Jones Act, such losses are
recoverable under common law actions. Finally, punitive damages are only awarded
in cases of willful and wanton misconduct, which is "a much higher standard of culpabili-
ty than that required for Jones Act liability." Id. Since this aggravated degree of
culpability determines the appropriateness of punitive damages, the nature of the
underlying claim is not an important consideration.
The issue of joinder was raised by the defendant in the instant case. He argued
that even if punitive damages were allowable in unseaworthiness cases, they should
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especially since the two causes of action are often joined in the same
litigation.
The court, while declining to decide the issue, did acknowledge
two possible impediments to the recovery of punitive damages in Jones
Act cases. First, its own decision in Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc."6
recognized the traditional pecuniary loss limitation of recovery under
the Jones Act. Second, decisions under the Federal Employer's Liabili-
ty Act (F.E.L.A" expressly bar recovery of punitive damages. The
Ivy restriction (i.e., recovery under the Jones Act is limited to
pecuniary loss), if extended to punitive damages, would certainly
preclude any such recoveries. However, the writer submits that
punitive damages should be viewed independently of the pecuniary-
nonpecuniary distinction, since in punitive damages cases the losses
or damages to the plaintiff are not at issue. The inquiry should be
whether F.E.L.A. precedents, which'were controlling in Ivy, should
apply to punitive damages.
The United States Supreme Court has held unequivocally that
punitive damages are not recoverable under the F.E.L.A.4 8 Although
the Jones Act adopts the provisions of the F.E.L.A., courts apply
F.E.L.A. precedents only when they conform to the special interests
and policies of admiralty law.49 Therefore, the issue of punitive
not be awarded when the unseaworthiness and Jones Act claims were joined. The
court held that joinder of the actions did not affect the remedies, citing several recent
decisions in which the Fifth Circuit awarded nonpecuniary damages although the
unseaworthiness claim had been joined with a Jones Act claim. See Cruz v. Hendy
Int'l Co., 638 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1980); Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980); Landry v. Two
R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1975). Undoubtedly, joinder of claims poses prob-
lems for the fact finder, particularly lay juries, who must distinguish carefully the
causes of action and award damages accordingly. Uniformity of recoveries would help
alleviate these problems.
46. 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. 45 U.S.C. SS 51-59 (1976).
48. See Gulf, Colo. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913); Michigan
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); American R.R. Co. of Porto Rico v.
Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145 (1913); see also Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 449 F.2d
1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
49. In Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955), the Supreme Court recognized that in
certain instances a strict application of F.E.L.A. precedents to Jones Act cases could
be counterproductive and tend to frustrate the aims of the Act. Thus, in Cox, the
mere absence of a reference in the F.E.L.A. to suits against the personal represen-
tative of the tortfeasor did not bar such a suit in admiralty. In The Arizona v. Anelich,
298 U.S. 110 (1936), the defendant argued for the application of the then extant rule
that assumption of risk was a defense in cases under the F.E.L.A., as long as the
defendant had not violated a safety statute. The Supreme Court held that regardless
of the provision of the F.E.L.A., this defense was not available in a Jones Act suit.
(A 1939 amendment abolished assumption of risk as a defense in all F.E.L.A. cases.)
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damages under the Jones Act may be decided without reference to
F.E.L.A. precedents. The controlling issue is public policy, and the
balancing process employed by the Fifth Circuit in Smith and Merry
Shipping is an appropriate means of analyzing the problem.
As previously noted, federal admiralty courts have employed
punitive damages as a means of enforcing specific standards of con-
duct. The absolute duty of the shipowner to maintain a safe workplace
for the seaman is a well established concept of admiralty law, and
Merry Shipping holds that punitive damages are justified as a deter-
rent to reckless disregard of that duty. ° Arguably, the Jones Act itself
reflects no compelling public policy directed at specific conduct. It was
passed only to eliminate the situation whereby a seaman had no
remedy for the negligence of his fellow servant." However, when Con-
gress acted, it did not grant merely a common law remedy. Instead,
Congress gave seamen access to the liberal terms and recoveries of
the F.E.L.A. It is submitted that, in so doing, Congress recognized
the unique status of seamen and the perils under which they work.
The United States Supreme Court recognized as much when it held
that the Jones Act was to be "liberally construed to carry out its
full purpose, which was to enlarge admiralty's protections to its
wards. '52
In view of this unique status, it should not matter whether the
dangers of maritime employment are enhanced by "operational
negligence" or unseaworthy conditions. It is the same state of mind
which is being punished-a state of mind that the Fifth Circuit found
dangerous and unacceptable in the maritime environment.
A possible argument against extension of punitive damages to the
Jones Act is that although the Act applies to the maritime environ-
ment, its protections follow seamen to many land-based activities
where their situation seems more analogous to that of railroad
workers, who were the F.E.L.A.'s initial concern. However, even on
land, seamen find themselves in unique and disadvantageous cir-
cumstances. The articles of employment which bind them to their
employers severely limit their freedom to disobey unsafe orders and
to avoid hazardous situations which may be imposed on them by their
masters.' It is this unique employment relationship which places
maritime employers in loco parentis to seamen.'
50. See text at note 26, supra.
51. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 325.
52. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942).
53. The requirements of the seaman's articles of employment are set forth in 46
U.S.C. SS 563-568 (1976). The required form is found in 46 U.S.C. S 713 (1976).
54. In re Den Norske Amerikalinge A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd
sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
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The traditional status of seamen as wards of admiralty has been
of tremendous importance in the development of admiralty law in
general and of punitive damages in particular. The same concern which
dictated the Merry Shipping decision should compel the application
of punitive damages to the Jones Act.
Charles Clifton St. Dizier

